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SU-57 AND INDIA'S PATH TO DEFENCE AUTONOMY: WHY IP RIGHTS MATTER

December 15, 2025

*Ms. Srishti Singh

INTRODUCTION:

A twin-engine stealth multirole fighter aircraft designed for both air superiority and strike missions, the Sukhoi Su-57E (hereinafter, “Su-57”) is an aircraft capable of going head-to-head with the American F-35 Lightning II and the Chinese J-20 Mighty Dragon. It is a fifth-generation Russian fighter jet, popularly referred to as, the “Felon,” for its advanced stealth capabilities. Su-57 can fly at a top speed of Mach 2, has a combat range of 1,900 km, and can carry a wide range of weapons – making it a fighter designed to dominate the skies. The real story, however, lies in the potential Intellectual Property (hereinafter, “IP”) terms of the deal. Recently, Russia approached India with an offer that seems almost too good to be true: proposing joint development of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft and promising “full licensed production”, “unrestricted technology transfer” and access to the source codes of Su-57’s most sensitive components. This article explores how the IP terms of the potential deal could play a critical role in securing technological autonomy and bolstering self-reliance.

THE OLD MODEL: SU-30 MKI CASE STUDY

In 1996, India signed a deal with Russia for buying 272 Sukhoi Su-30s (hereinafter, “Su-30”) to replace its MiG-21s and MiG27s. India made major design changes to the acquired aircraft by integrating Israeli, French and indigenous technology, leading to the creation of a highly specialized and upgraded variant – Su-30 MKI (Modernized Commercial Indian). Although, Russia granted the manufacturing know-how to India and permitted Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (hereinafter, “HAL”) to produce the fighters, Russia retained IP sovereignty over critical components like engines, radars and airframes. Consequently, the agreement did not provide for complete Transfer of Technology (hereinafter, “ToT”) to India. HAL’s role was thus, confined to the final assembly of the aircraft, without substantive knowledge of the internal systems. In 2012, HAL began producing Su-30 MKIs under license but, the cost of production per jet significantly exceeded the cost of direct imports, costing USD 55 million per aircraft.

Another bottleneck remains the AL-31F engine which powers Su-30 MKIs. Russia’s tight control over the engine’s IP forces India to either import critical parts of the engine from Russia or manufacture them using materials and machinery supplied from Russia. Moreover, with HAL barred to tinker with AL-31F’s design, independent production of the engine continued to pose a significant challenge for India.

Thus, the core issues lie in the restrictive IP arrangement which gives rise to three principal challenges for India. Firstly, India lacks technology sovereignty as it does not own the core IP of Su-30. Any major modifications, upgrades, or integration of indigenous components into the aircraft require approvals from the Russian design bureaus leading to significant delays in production. Secondly, although India can produce its variant of the Su-30, with several indigenous components, it cannot market or sell this version to a third country without Russia’s consent. This affects India’s defence export potential and strategic autonomy. Thirdly, as Russia retains the source code of critical components, India is highly dependent on Russia for spare parts and maintenance of the aircraft. This subjects India to supply-chain uncertainties, geopolitical risks and potential delays. Consequently, India’s operational and strategic capabilities remain limited by the restrictive terms of this arrangement.

THE IDEAL FUTURE: BRAHMOS CASE STUDY

The BrahMos Joint Venture model should be the blueprint for India’s upcoming Su-57 deal. Its history can be traced back to the signing of the Inter-Governmental Agreement by Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam, then Secretary, Department of Defence Research and Development and NV Mikhailov, then Deputy Defence Minister of Russia. The agreement paved the way for BrahMos Aerospace – a joint venture entity between India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia (NPOM). India holds a 50.5% equity stake in the company, while Russia holds the remaining 49.5%. Both the countries maintain equal stakes in the intellectual property rights (hereinafter, “IPR”) and export rights under the joint venture agreement.

This joint venture model should guide the way for the Su-57 deal because, firstly, it provides shared IP ownership to India and Russia, which gives both the countries an equal stake in the production, marketing and export of BrahMos missiles. Accordingly, any sale to a third country requires prior consent from both India and Russia. Secondly, shared IPR allows India to lead the development of indigenous components, such as the seeker and software, along with implementing upgrades and modification without being blocked by Russia. This gives India significant control over BrahMos products and their evolution. Thirdly, although consent is required from both the countries for exports, it has enabled India to secure major deals in the Indo-Pacific region, with countries like the Philippines and, in the near future, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Taiwan.

THE WAY FORWARD

Russia’s current offer of unrestricted technology transfer represents a significant opportunity for India to acquire full technology sovereignty over the fifth-generation stealth fighter. To ensure that the Su-57 deal is a strategic win for Atmanirbhar Bharat, India should secure non-negotiable IPR guarantees. India must demand three things – firstly, complete access to the source code and the right to alter, adapt and reuse this code. This will enable the integration of indigenous weapons such as, Astra, BrahMos, the design of indigenous electronic warfare suites and the performance of crucial lifetime software updates. Secondly, unconditional export rights which would allow India to market and export locally produced and modified Su-57s to other countries without requiring Russia’s approval. Thirdly, India must demand rights to protect its indigenous modifications to the aircraft.

CONCLUSION

The Su-57 deal has the potential to redefine India’s military future. The IP terms in this deal will determine whether the Su-57 acquisition is a simple purchase, as in the Su-30 MKI or a foundational step towards Atmanirbhar Bharat as demonstrated by BrahMos. Therefore, India must push for full access to the source codes of critical components, export rights for the Indian version and complete IPR over the indigenous upgrades.

REFERENCES

  1. From Vietnam to Saudi Arabia, How Countries are Queuing up to Buy BrahMis after Operation Sindoor, Firstpost (Jul. 17, 2025, 23:56 PM) https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/from-vietnam-to-saudi-arabia-how-countries-are-queuing-up-to-buy-brahmos-after-operation-sindoor-13888409.html.
  2. History of BrahMos Aerospace, BrahMos (2025), https://www.brahmos.com/page/history.
  3. Isaac Seitz, Su-57E: Why India Might Buy Russia's New Stealth Fighter - National Security Journal, National Security Journal (Jun. 15, 2025), https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/su-57e-why-india-might-buy-russias-new-stealth-fighter/.
  4. Kartik Bommakanti, India-Russia Military-Technical Cooperation: Beyond Commercial Relations, 184 ORF Issue Brief 1, 4 (2017), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kartik-Bommakanti/publication/317740541_India-Russia_Military-Technical_Cooperation_Beyond_Commercial_Relations/links/594b61dcaca2723195de97b6/India-Russia-Military-Technical-Cooperation-Beyond-Commercial-Relations.pdf.
  5. Manjeet Negi, India to discuss S-400, Sukhoi-57 deals during Putin's Delhi visit, India Today (Nov. 28, 2025) https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-russia-summit-s400-sukhoi57-defence-talks-vladimir-putin-2827848-2025-11-28.
  6. Su-30 MKI ‘Mistake’: Lessons Learned and Why India Should Push for Technology Transfer, India Defence Research Wing (Apr. 22, 2025), https://idrw.org/su-30-mki-mistake-lessons-learned-and-why-india-should-push-for-technology-transfer/#:~:text=The%20%E2%80%9CSu%2D30%20mistake%E2%80%9D,build%20a%20robust%20aviation%20industry.
  7. TM Srinath, Transfer of Technology in Indian Defence Manufacture - Elements and Challenges, J.M.R.A. 6, 7 (2020).
  8. Why Russia’s Offer to Provide Su-57 Stealth Fighter Jet Tech to India is Pathbreaking, Firstpost (Nov. 20, 2025, 17:26 PM), https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/russia-su-57-stealth-fighter-jet-tech-india-13952482.html.

Author:
*Ms. Srishti Singh,
4th Year B.A., LL.B. Student, Army Institute of Law, Mohali.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in the article are the personal opinions of the author. The facts and opinions appearing in the article do not reflect the views of the Alliance Centre for Intellectual Property Rights (ACIPR) and the Centre does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.